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We shall try to reply to respondent's brief in short 
clear statements. Although we pointed out in our main 
brief that the amendments to sub. Sec. 4 and 6 were made 
by the Code Committee, and that a change so made is not 
entitled to the same weight as a legislative enactment (1pg. 
25) counsel nevertheless continues to say and repeat, tim3 
and again, that said amendments "were made (or enacted) 
by the legislature." 
We cannot agree with their statem(ent on the middle of 
. -
page 3, that, in Sec. 101-4-5 the legislature placed heirs in 
three classes: (1) lineal, (2) collateral, and (3) next of kin. 
Sec. 101-4-13 expr·essly provides for only-two classes:-(1) 
direct line or lineal consanguinity, and (2) those who "do 
not descend from one another, but spring from a: common 
ancestor, is called the collateral line or collateral consang-
uinity." Sec. 101-4-15 provides how degress in the direct 
line (lineal) are counted; and sec. 101-4-16 provides how 
degrees of _consanguinity are· counted in the collateral line· 
There is no classification of next of kin as a selparate and 
third cla.S,s of heirs in our statute. 
Nor do we agree with counsel's statement on page 3~ 
and again at the bottom of pg. 23 that sub. sees. 7 and 8 
deal with lineal descendants. We submit that those two 
sections deals with collateral heirs. Thus, sec. (7) provides 
for the estate of ·a deceased unmarried minor child, to go to 
his brothers and sisters,-''the other children of the same. 
parent and to the issue of any such other children who ar~ 
dead, by right of representation." Sec. (8) provides that if. 
the brothers and sisters of such deceased minor child are 
all dead, ''then the estate that came to the deceased child 
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by inheritance from his parents, descends to the issue of all 
other children of the same parent, and if all the issue are in 
the same degree of kindred to the child, (uncle) they share~ 
the estate equally, otherwise they take by right of re1pre-
sentation." 
Counsel did not ans\Yer our argument (page 29) when 
we submitted (8) as practically controlling the case at bar, 
to show the intent of the legislature, and the meaning of 
legislature, and the meaning of our statute as a whole. Why 
not give the court the benefit of their answer, if they have 
one? We again submit that (8) should be held to be largely 
controlling in case at bar. 
Instead of meeting and answering that argument, they 
content themselves by erroneously classifying sec. ( 8) as 
dealing with ''lineal descendants-" They say, (page 27) 
"'There is no dispute that the legislature provided that in all 
instances where the lineal descendants of a decedent are in 
equal degree, they inherit equally. (sub-sections 1, 2, 7 and 
8) ." 
At the bottom of page 4, counsel say, "'The purpose of 
this amendment (adding 'or grandchildren' to sub. sec. 4)· 
was to bring the law in harmony in all its aslpects regarding 
the distribution of property to collateral heirs, thus pro-
viding that in each instance, collateral heirs to and includ-
ing grandchildren of deceased brothers and sisters should 
inherit by representation." 
Just how that amendment to (4) brought ''the law in 
harmony in all its aspects regarding the distribution of 
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property to collateral heirs" counsel fails to explain. 
Counsel likewise car·efully a void answering our argu-
ment (set forth point by 'Point·on pages 12-26) wherein we· 
claim that ( 4) and (6) are ambiguous, indefinite and un-
certain as they now stand, (if they are to be read together)· 
and why 've contend that the negative phrase ''nor child-
ren or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister" in 
(6) should be disregarded by the court, because of its con-
fusiqn, _uncertainty, and ambiguity; and the heirs herein 
should be held to take equally as next of kin under (6), as 
they did prior to that purpotted amendment. 
It is no answer to say, as counsel do on page 6, that 
''prior to 1933~ collateral heirs, after brothers and sisters 
were treated as next of kin, wher·e there was no surviving 
brother or sister ( 6) ,'' nor that "by the amendment our 
legislature provided that children or grandchildren of any 
deceased brother or sister of decedent would not thereafter 
inherit as hext of kin under (6) ,-that they were eX!pressly 
(xclude.d from its provisions." _To point out where the heirs 
her.ein were excluded, merely shows a negative, a mer~ 
vacancy. Why don't they point out, if they can, wherein 
the heirs herein, have been positively provided for under, 
our statute.;! Where the statute states in what capacity-
they shall take or share in this estate? 
For the sake of argument we conceded (on page 26) 
that the a__pp:ar.ent purpose of ins-erting that negative phrase 
in (6) was to take nieces and nephews out af their former 
classification a.s next of kin, and classify them as collateral~ 
heirs. But we there stated m·ere re-classification was not 
. enough. That "there must be a corresponding grant of 
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5 
succession of estate to them as such collateral heirs, other-
wise there is a hiatus in the statute. Mere changing of the 
classification is not sufficient." 
Why didn't counsel answer that point? Counsel merely 
say, (pg. 6) "but they would inherit as collateral descen-
dants under subsection 4." 
Thus they beg the very question at issue. Why don't 
they explain, if they can, how or why the heirs herein 
would ''inherit under (4} ," when that subsection had there-
tofore been construed (as they admit in their brief) to 
apply only where a brother or sister survived? Why don't 
they tell the court how they avoid the rule that if a section 
has been codified from a judicial decision, it is to be con-
strued in the light of such prior judicial construction? That 
the prior court interpretation is presumed to be continued 
as the legislative intent after the amendment? That ''as an 
aid in the construction of a statute -it is to be assumed or 
presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had 
in mind the judicial construction of the former statute ( 4) 
on the subject." 
We cited and pointed out those rules of construction on 
pages 9-10 and 19-23, of our main brief, citing the author-
ities. But counsel 1nake no answer. We submit that their 
silence amounts to an admission that said rules of con-
struction should apply here; that adding the words ''or' 
grandchildren" in ( 4) did not and could not change the, 
meaning, operation and effect of section ( 4) from the prior 
judicial interpretation given that section, and hence it 
should and will be presumed in case at bar that the legis-
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lature intended that ( 4) should still apply only if a brother 
or sister survived.-And the fact that the heirs herein have 
been excluded by the amendment in (6) cannot change or 
affect the meaning of (4), but only shows how ambiguous 
and uncertain (6) now is, and why the purported amend-
ment to ( 6) should be ignored and disregarded until the 
legislature sees fit to clarify the statute. 
We think· counsels' analysis (page 15) of the two· 
California cases-Estate of Nigro-156 P. 1019, and th~ 
Ross Es~at~ 202· P. 614 is incorrect and unsound. They say 
·the California court's conclusion "was the result o£ the 
interpretation of subsections 3 and 5 of the California act 
and not only subsection 3 thereof as aJppellant would have 
the court believe. The court said that subsections 3 and 5 
of the act must be construed together. Subsection 3 of the 
California act and subsection 4 of our act are substantially 
the same, whereas subsection 5 of the California act and 
subsection 6 of our act are materially different." 
The big point which counsel overlook, is, that in both 
of said California cases, a number of the· heirs, (grand-
nieces and grandnephews and great-grandnieces and great-
grandnephews) were claiming that the estate should be 
distributed under (3) by representation· But the court held, 
in both of said cases, that (3) did not apply, when no 
brothers . or sisters survived the intestate; and hence the. 
court, in both of said cases, distributed the entire estate 
under (5), equally (per capita) to the next of kin,-to the 
nieces and nephews. Thus the rnore distant heirs were 
excluded, . who would however, have participated if the 
estate had been distributed under (3) on a representative 
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basis. 
When counsel concedes that ''Subsection 3 of the Cali-
fornia act and subsection 4 of our act are substantially the 
same" we submit counsel must also concede that, at least so 
far as said California cases are concerned, Utah ( 4) does 
not apply unless a brother or sister survives the intestate. 
Counsels' further analysis and conclusion is equally 
unsound. They- say, "In contrast to this, however, our act 
( 6) provides that 'children or grandchildren of a deceased 
brother or sister' are expressly excluded from inheriting as 
next of kin under subsection 6, and they can only inherit 
under subsection 4, which provides for inheritance by repre-
sentation." We have already answered that argument: that 
merely because these heirs are excluded in (6) is no reason 
why they should be held automatically to take under ( 4), 
·when (4) does not apply to them. 
Just why the court should do some legislation here (so 
that respondents could take the lion's part of this estate), 
counsel does not explain. When it is conceded that (4) did 
not apply, and had been construed not to a.JPply, unless aJ 
brother or sister survived, how can the court now be asked· 
to hold that ( 4) automatically applies, because of some1 
.J 
abortive change or amendment in (6)? 
That is why we contend that the purport-ed amendment 
to ( 6) , make both ( 4) and ( 6) ambiguous and indefinite, 
especially if counsels' argument is followed. That is why 
we also contend that because of the confusion and uncer-
. tainty, caused by that (abortive) amendment to (6),-in .. 
serting the negative phrase ''nor children or grandchildren 
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of any deceased brother or sister" in ( 6) , this court is 
warranted 1n disregarding and ignoring said amendm-ant 
and in distributing this estate under the IJrovisons of (6), 
pror to the purported amendment, equally to the next of 
kin; under which all of the heirs herein will share or take 
on a per capita basis. 
We have no quarrel with counsels' statement ( pages 9 
to 10) of the 1\tlinnesota statute and decision. As far as quote 
'is ·applicable we think it su(pports appellant's contention in 
case at bar. 
Their cited statute and quotation (pg. 11-13) from New 
Jersey are not helpful in case at bar. For the New Jersey 
statute was clear and definite; it was not subject to all the 
ambiguity, uncertainty, and possibility of escheat, which 
now exists under Utah (6) under the purported amend-
ment. 
The quote by counsel from the New Jersey court, (at 
the bottom of 1page 12 and top of page 13) supports our 
contention that mere words of description or reclassifica-
tion is not enough, but that there must be a statutory 
grant stating in what capacity these heirs shall take or 
share in this estate. The New Jersey court observed that 
the effect of the amended statute was to deprive nieces and 
nephews of distribution to them on a per capita basis, as 
next of kin, ''for the terms of the statute, in its reference 
·to the representative of deceased brothers and sisters, are 
not mere words of description, but are clearly intended to 
indicate the cajpacity in which the (children) representa·l 
tives of deceased brothers and sisters shall tal\:e or share 
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in the estate." 
The quotation from the Tenness·ee court, (pg. 13-14) is 
not helpful, for that statute was obviously different from 
( 4) and ( 6) of our statute. 
The quotation from the California court in case of Van 
Tiger vs The Superior Court, 60 P. 2nd 851, (pg. 16-18) to 
the effect that California has now held, that under the late 
amendments, (Sec. 225, 226, California Probate Code) that 
nieces and nephews now take by representation, and not 
p2r capita., does not help respondents. That decision was 
made under the new California Probate Code, where Cal. 
(3), (Utah (4), was entirely rewritten and reworded so as 
to overcome the prior California decisions that (3) applied 
only when a brother or sister survived. 
\Ve discussed these amendments in the California law 
and compared them with the Utah amendments, on pgs. 
13-15 of our main brief. Although we had not then run 
across the Van Tiger case, we anticipated that such would' 
now be the intel"pretation of the new sections 225, and 226, 
and so stated on page 14. No claim is made that Utah ( 4)' 
has been similarly amended; and no such claim could logical-
ly be made· 
On page 20 counsel say they can dispose of our concern 
of escheat in a few words. ''In his ~ypothetical case, the 
property would all vest in the surviving heirs, the heirs of 
the surviving brothers. There would be no escheat to the 
estate. This is elementary." But in the case we supposed 
(pg. 16-18) there were no surviving brothers. All three 
brothers had predeceased the intestate. So will counsel 
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please try again? If it is so elementary, who would take or 
inherit the share which would have gone to the third bro-
ther who left him surviving, only great grandchildren? 
Neither do counsel answer the dilemma, which we 
said contestants were in, (at bottom of page 24 and top of 
pg. 25 of our brief) although we asked them to do so. At 
the top of pg. 25 we said, "We hope counsel will clear up, if 
they can, the confusion, ambiguity, uncertainty, injustice, 
and possibility escheat which is now packed in (6) ." 
We do not think it is helpful to the court for counsel 
merely to keep saying that the amendm·ents to (4) and (6) 
"are clear and unambiguous", when they fail or refuse to 
answer the specific points of ambiguity, uncertainty, con-
fusion, injustice and 1possibility of escheat, which we raised 
and pointed out in our main brief. 
Counsel -say that we dscuss too much the "injustice" 
of the effect of the amendments to (4) and (6), (if con-
strued as contended for by the r-espondents), that the ques-
tion of the justice or injustice of inheritance statutes is for 
the legislature and not the courts. 
Our reason for this discussion on ''injustice" (pg. 12), 
was the statement of the ·Code Committee, that said amend-
ments had been made ''to .meet the injustice resulting from 
the decision of its (California) courts under a statute 
identical with ours." 
We showed in our main brief that this so called ''in-
justice" had not been remedied by the Code Committee, but 
had in fact been aggravated, if ( 4) and (6) are to be in-
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terpreted and construed as contended for by respondents. 
'\IVhy didn't counsel answer our argument in that respect, if 
they had an answer? 
Respectfully submitted, 
LE.ON FONNESB~ECK, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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